[pve-devel] [PATCH pve-docs V2] improve spectre/meltdown cpu flags documentation
Alexandre Derumier
aderumier at odiso.com
Tue Sep 4 12:53:57 CEST 2018
-add new cpuflags for spectre v4.
-split cpuflags between amd && intel processors
---
qm.adoc | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/qm.adoc b/qm.adoc
index 1451f5d..718ecb6 100644
--- a/qm.adoc
+++ b/qm.adoc
@@ -307,56 +307,110 @@ theory this will give your guests maximum performance.
Meltdown / Spectre related CPU flags
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-There are two CPU flags related to the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities
+There are several CPU flags related to the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities
footnote:[Meltdown Attack https://meltdownattack.com/] which need to be set
manually unless the selected CPU type of your VM already enables them by default.
-The first, called 'pcid', helps to reduce the performance impact of the Meltdown
-mitigation called 'Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI)', which effectively hides
-the Kernel memory from the user space. Without PCID, KPTI is quite an expensive
-mechanism footnote:[PCID is now a critical performance/security feature on x86
-https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU].
-
-The second CPU flag is called 'spec-ctrl', which allows an operating system to
-selectively disable or restrict speculative execution in order to limit the
-ability of attackers to exploit the Spectre vulnerability.
-
-There are two requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to use these two
+There are two requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to use these
CPU flags:
* The host CPU(s) must support the feature and propagate it to the guest's virtual CPU(s)
* The guest operating system must be updated to a version which mitigates the
attacks and is able to utilize the CPU feature
-In order to use 'spec-ctrl', your CPU or system vendor also needs to provide a
+Otherwise you need to set the desired CPU flag of the virtual CPU, either by
+editing the CPU options in the WebUI, or by setting the 'flags' property of the
+'cpu' option in the VM configuration file.
+
+For Spectre v1,v2,v4 fixes, your CPU or system vendor also needs to provide a
so-called ``microcode update'' footnote:[You can use `intel-microcode' /
`amd-microcode' from Debian non-free if your vendor does not provide such an
update. Note that not all affected CPUs can be updated to support spec-ctrl.]
for your CPU.
-To check if the {pve} host supports PCID, execute the following command as root:
+
+To check if the {pve} host is vulnerable, execute the following command as root:
----
-# grep ' pcid ' /proc/cpuinfo
+for f in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/*; do echo "${f##*/} -" $(cat "$f"); done
----
-If this does not return empty your host's CPU has support for 'pcid'.
+A community script is also avalaible to detect is the host is still vulnerable.
+footnote:[spectre-meltdown-checker https://meltdown.ovh/]
-To check if the {pve} host supports spec-ctrl, execute the following command as root:
+Intel processors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+* 'pcid'
++
+This reduce the performance impact of the Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) mitigation
+called 'Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI)', which effectively hides
+the Kernel memory from the user space. Without PCID, KPTI is quite an expensive
+mechanism footnote:[PCID is now a critical performance/security feature on x86
+https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU].
++
+To check if the {pve} host supports PCID, execute the following command as root:
++
----
-# grep ' spec_ctrl ' /proc/cpuinfo
+# grep ' pcid ' /proc/cpuinfo
----
++
+If this does not return empty your host's CPU has support for 'pcid'.
-If this does not return empty your host's CPU has support for 'spec-ctrl'.
+* 'spec-ctrl'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix,
+in cases where retpolines are not sufficient.
+Included by default in Intel CPU models with -IBRS suffix.
+Must be explicitly turned on for Intel CPU models without -IBRS suffix.
+Requires the host CPU microcode (intel-microcode >= 20180425).
++
+* 'ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix. Not included by default in any Intel CPU model.
+Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
+Requires the host CPU microcode(intel-microcode >= 20180703).
-If you use `host' or another CPU type which enables the desired flags by
-default, and you updated your guest OS to make use of the associated CPU
-features, you're already set.
-Otherwise you need to set the desired CPU flag of the virtual CPU, either by
-editing the CPU options in the WebUI, or by setting the 'flags' property of the
-'cpu' option in the VM configuration file.
+AMD processors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+* 'ibpb'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix,
+in cases where retpolines are not sufficient.
+Included by default in AMD CPU models with -IBPB suffix.
+Must be explicitly turned on for AMD CPU models without -IBPB suffix.
+Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs.
+
+
+
+* 'virt-ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix.
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
+Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
+This should be provided to guests, even if amd-ssbd is also provided, for maximum guest compatibility.
+Note for some QEMU / libvirt versions, this must be force enabled when when using "Host model",
+because this is a virtual feature that doesn’t exist in the physical host CPUs.
+
+
+* 'amd-ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix.
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
+This provides higher performance than virt-ssbd so should be exposed to guests whenever available in the host.
+virt-ssbd should none the less also be exposed for maximum guest compatibility as some kernels only know about virt-ssbd.
+
+
+* 'amd-no-ssb'
++
+Recommended to indicate the host is not vulnerable to Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639).
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
+Future hardware generations of CPU will not be vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639,
+and thus the guest should be told not to enable its mitigations, by exposing amd-no-ssb.
+This is mutually exclusive with virt-ssbd and amd-ssbd.
+
NUMA
^^^^
--
2.11.0
More information about the pve-devel
mailing list