[pve-devel] [PATCH] add CVE fixes
Thomas Lamprecht
t.lamprecht at proxmox.com
Wed Jul 12 13:49:53 CEST 2017
CVE-2014-9900: net: Zeroing the structure ethtool_wolinfo in ethtool_get_wol()
CVE-2017-7346: drm/vmwgfx: limit the number of mip levels in vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl()
CVE-2017-9605: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
CVE-2017-1000380:
* ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
* ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
---
cherry-picked from master next.
...-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch | 47 ++++++++++++
...Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++
...LSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++
...limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch | 46 ++++++++++++
...x-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch | 68 ++++++++++++++++++
Makefile | 5 ++
6 files changed, 315 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
create mode 100644 CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
create mode 100644 CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
create mode 100644 CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
create mode 100644 CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
diff --git a/CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch b/CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..146ef95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 38e360ea72f11241adede7ea2b22d8d536fe490b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec at codeaurora.org>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 15:41:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] net: Zeroing the structure ethtool_wolinfo in
+ ethtool_get_wol()
+
+CVE-2014-9900
+
+memset() the structure ethtool_wolinfo that has padded bytes
+but the padded bytes have not been zeroed out.
+
+Change-Id: If3fd2d872a1b1ab9521d937b86a29fc468a8bbfe
+Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec at codeaurora.org>
+(cherry-picked from commit 63c317dbee97983004dffdd9f742a20d17150071
+ https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10)
+Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
+---
+ net/core/ethtool.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
+index d92de0a1f0a4..c06c6acf78c5 100644
+--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
++++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
+@@ -1449,11 +1449,13 @@ static int ethtool_reset(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
+
+ static int ethtool_get_wol(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
+ {
+- struct ethtool_wolinfo wol = { .cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL };
++ struct ethtool_wolinfo wol;
+
+ if (!dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
++ memset(&wol, 0, sizeof(struct ethtool_wolinfo));
++ wol.cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL;
+ dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol(dev, &wol);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &wol, sizeof(wol)))
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch b/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8753fc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 993c7c14bbc4bf51025bb5c83c1c130417e0e823 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at
+ SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
+
+snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
+it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
+concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
+buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
+kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
+
+ BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
+ CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
+ Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
+ dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
+ kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
+ kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
+ copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
+ snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
+ do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
+ __do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
+ do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
+ vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
+ do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
+ SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
+ SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
+
+This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
+previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>
+Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>
+Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
+
+CVE-2017-1000380
+
+(cherry-picked from commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728)
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
+---
+ sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
+index 3c11a6983f54..e5ddc475dca4 100644
+--- a/sound/core/timer.c
++++ b/sound/core/timer.c
+@@ -1622,6 +1622,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto __err;
+
++ tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
+ kfree(tu->queue);
+ tu->queue = NULL;
+ kfree(tu->tqueue);
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch b/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6c197c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 425e11483546f928109e5871a2c8b0fba3ddb3b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
+
+The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
+may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
+read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
+snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
+among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
+between read vs ioctl.
+
+This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
+range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
+race window.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>
+Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>
+Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
+
+CVE-2017-1000380
+
+(cherry-picked from commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378)
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
+---
+ sound/core/timer.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
+index ad153149b231..3c11a6983f54 100644
+--- a/sound/core/timer.c
++++ b/sound/core/timer.c
+@@ -1963,6 +1963,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+
+ tu = file->private_data;
+ unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
++ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+ while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
+ while (!tu->qused) {
+@@ -1978,7 +1979,9 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
++ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ schedule();
++ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+
+ remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
+@@ -1998,7 +2001,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ tu->qused--;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+
+- mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ if (tu->tread) {
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
+ sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
+@@ -2008,7 +2010,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+- mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+ if (err < 0)
+@@ -2018,6 +2019,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ }
+ _error:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
++ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ return result > 0 ? result : err;
+ }
+
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch b/CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f30a15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From ab13cf852828060a7d9550c05197e5303de7aefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:09:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] drm/vmwgfx: limit the number of mip levels in
+ vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl()
+
+CVE-2017-7346
+
+The 'req->mip_levels' parameter in vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is
+a user-controlled 'uint32_t' value which is used as a loop count limit.
+This can lead to a kernel lockup and DoS. Add check for 'req->mip_levels'.
+
+References:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1437431
+
+Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh at vmware.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit ee9c4e681ec4f58e42a83cb0c22a0289ade1aacf)
+Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+index 8da50fce3b77..56b803384ea2 100644
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+@@ -1280,6 +1280,9 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
+ if (req->multisample_count != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
+ vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
+ 128;
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch b/CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..243a32a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From a2285dfad4c68beb9a8376fa2a2df905319b11fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sinclair Yeh <syeh at vmware.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 17:28:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
+
+When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
+we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
+
+The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
+second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
+req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
+
+Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org>
+Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister at insomniasec.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh at vmware.com>
+Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat at vmware.com>
+
+CVE-2017-9605
+
+(cherry picked from commit 07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c)
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht at proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+index 05fa092c942b..8da50fce3b77 100644
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
+ struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
+ int ret;
+ uint32_t size;
+- uint32_t backup_handle;
++ uint32_t backup_handle = 0;
+
+ if (req->multisample_count != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1315,12 +1315,16 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
+ ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
+ &res->backup,
+ &user_srf->backup_base);
+- if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
+- res->backup_size) {
+- DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
+- vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
+- ret = -EINVAL;
+- goto out_unlock;
++ if (ret == 0) {
++ if (res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
++ res->backup_size) {
++ DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
++ vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto out_unlock;
++ } else {
++ backup_handle = req->buffer_handle;
++ }
+ }
+ } else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
+ ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index dc293f6..f9543f9 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -234,6 +234,11 @@ ${KERNEL_SRC}/README ${KERNEL_CFG_ORG}: ${KERNEL_SRC_SUBMODULE} | submodules
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../kvm-dynamic-halt-polling-disable-default.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../cgroup-cpuset-add-cpuset.remap_cpus.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../0001-netfilter-nft_set_rbtree-handle-re-addition-element-.patch # DoS from within (unpriv) containers
+ cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
+ cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
+ cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
+ cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
+ cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
sed -i ${KERNEL_SRC}/Makefile -e 's/^EXTRAVERSION.*$$/EXTRAVERSION=${EXTRAVERSION}/'
touch $@
--
2.11.0
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