[pve-devel] [PATCH stable-4 kernel 4/5] drop patches applied upstream

[Fabian Grünbichler]

Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler at proxmox.com>
---
 Makefile                                           |  2 -
 ...alidate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch | 51 ----------------------
 ...alidate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch | 41 -----------------
 3 files changed, 94 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 CVE-2017-7184-0001-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch
 delete mode 100644 CVE-2017-7184-0002-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 681ad6c..5ad615c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -266,8 +266,6 @@ ${KERNEL_SRC}/README ${KERNEL_CFG_ORG}: ${KERNELSRCTAR}
 	cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../cgroup-cpuset-add-cpuset.remap_cpus.patch
 	cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-2596-kvm-page-reference-leakage-in-handle_vmon.patch
 	cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../Revert-intel_idle-Add-CPU-model-54-Atom-N2000-series.patch
-	cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7184-0001-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch
-	cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7184-0002-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch
 	sed -i ${KERNEL_SRC}/Makefile -e 's/^EXTRAVERSION.*$$/EXTRAVERSION=${EXTRAVERSION}/'
 	touch $@
 
diff --git a/CVE-2017-7184-0001-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch b/CVE-2017-7184-0001-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 369ee7e..0000000
--- a/CVE-2017-7184-0001-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_V.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 7f223b44260db3bd37b279534d287b76f2589fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
- replay_window
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
-validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
-and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
-buffer.  However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call.  There we again validate the size of the supplied
-buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents.  We do
-not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
-memory.  This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
-netlink packets.  This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
-priviledge escalation.
-
-We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
-xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len().  This confirms that the user
-is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
-includes the replay_esn.  It however does not check the replay_window
-remains within that buffer.  Add validation of the contained
-replay_window.
-
-CVE-2017-7184
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
-
-Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler at proxmox.com>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-index 805681a..0e1f833 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
- 	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
-+	if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
diff --git a/CVE-2017-7184-0002-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch b/CVE-2017-7184-0002-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index db77d70..0000000
--- a/CVE-2017-7184-0002-xfrm_user-validate-XFRM_MSG_NEWAE-incoming-ESN-size-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 4e5d70856a6d11cb6c174c6a304a7ef3788e00be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size
- harder
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
-wrapping issues.  To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
-structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
-by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
-
-CVE-2017-7184
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
-
-Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler at proxmox.com>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-index 0e1f833..7a5a64e 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
-@@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
- 	up = nla_data(rp);
- 	ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
- 
--	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
-+	/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
-+	 * potential overflow. */
-+	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
-+	    xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
-+	    replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
- 	if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
-- 
2.1.4