[pdm-devel] [PATCH datacenter-manager v3 04/23] server: add probe-tls endpoint

[Lukas Wagner]

On Thu Aug 21, 2025 at 10:39 AM CEST, Dominik Csapak wrote:
> so that we can probe pve endpoints regarding fingerprint/certificate
> validity
>
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Csapak <d.csapak at proxmox.com>
> ---
>  server/src/api/pve/mod.rs | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/server/src/api/pve/mod.rs b/server/src/api/pve/mod.rs
> index 1a3a725..c03d352 100644
> --- a/server/src/api/pve/mod.rs
> +++ b/server/src/api/pve/mod.rs
> @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use proxmox_schema::property_string::PropertyString;
>  use proxmox_section_config::typed::SectionConfigData;
>  use proxmox_sortable_macro::sortable;
>  
> -use pdm_api_types::remotes::{NodeUrl, Remote, RemoteType, REMOTE_ID_SCHEMA};
> +use pdm_api_types::remotes::{NodeUrl, Remote, RemoteType, TlsProbeOutcome, REMOTE_ID_SCHEMA};
>  use pdm_api_types::resource::PveResource;
>  use pdm_api_types::{
>      Authid, RemoteUpid, HOST_OPTIONAL_PORT_FORMAT, PRIV_RESOURCE_AUDIT, PRIV_RESOURCE_DELETE,
> @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ use pve_api_types::{ClusterResourceKind, ClusterResourceType};
>  
>  use super::resources::{map_pve_lxc, map_pve_node, map_pve_qemu, map_pve_storage};
>  
> -use crate::connection;
>  use crate::connection::PveClient;
> +use crate::connection::{self, probe_tls_connection};
>  use crate::remote_tasks;
>  
>  mod lxc;
> @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ pub const ROUTER: Router = Router::new()
>  #[sortable]
>  const SUBDIRS: SubdirMap = &sorted!([
>      ("remotes", &REMOTES_ROUTER),
> +    ("probe-tls", &Router::new().post(&API_METHOD_PROBE_TLS)),
>      ("scan", &Router::new().post(&API_METHOD_SCAN_REMOTE_PVE)),
>      (
>          "realms",
> @@ -299,6 +300,37 @@ fn check_guest_delete_perms(
>      )
>  }
>  
> +#[api(
> +    input: {
> +        properties: {
> +            hostname: {
> +                type: String,
> +                format: &HOST_OPTIONAL_PORT_FORMAT,
> +                description: "Hostname (with optional port) of the target remote",
> +            },
> +            fingerprint: {
> +                type: String,
> +                description: "Fingerprint of the target remote.",
> +                optional: true,
> +            },
> +        },
> +    },
> +    access: {
> +        permission:
> +            &Permission::Privilege(&["/"], PRIV_SYS_MODIFY, false),

Does it make sense to require SYS_MODIFY here? Technically the user of
the PDM API could also probe themselves, since they have the hostname
anyway.
Is this to limit the abuse potential of some rogue logged-in
user hammering other servers with TLS probe requests while 'hiding' behind
PDM?

> +    },
> +)]
> +/// Probe the hosts TLS certificate.
> +///
> +/// If the certificate is not trusted with the given parameters, returns the certificate
> +/// information.
> +async fn probe_tls(
> +    hostname: String,
> +    fingerprint: Option<String>,
> +) -> Result<TlsProbeOutcome, Error> {
> +    probe_tls_connection(RemoteType::Pve, hostname, fingerprint).await
> +}
> +
>  #[api(
>      input: {
>          properties: {